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What was the effect of the London congestion charge on traffic accidents injuries and fatalities? Research
by Colin Green finds that the introduction of the London congestion charge reduced the count of
traffic accidents in Central London by 30 a month – an enormous 40 per cent reduction. Accidents
that result in individuals being killed or seriously injured (KSIs) also fell, by just under 4 a month, or
45 a year.
London holds the title of one of the world’s most congested cities. Transport for London reported
average road travel speeds of just 8.6 mph for the early 2000s, with 1/3 of all travel time spent
simply not moving. In response, London introduced in 2003 a £5 charge for motor vehicles to enter
the central district. Economists have long called for such charges as they serve to internalise the otherwise external
social cost that drivers create by increasing congestion for other drivers. Thus, when deciding whether or not to
drive into Central London, the individual now faces both their own private cost but also a charge aimed at
incorporating the social cost into their decision. While not without controversy, the policy reduced traffic congestion
during the times of the charge, weekdays from morning to early evening.
The introduction of congestion charging influences traffic accidents, and related injuries and fatalities. On the one
hand, less traffic naturally implies less accidents. On the other hand, the resulting higher travel speeds likely
increase the severity of accidents that do occur. This, combined with the fact that some of the reduction in private
cars entering the zone coincided with an increase in bike and motorcycle traffic, suggests an increase in severe
traffic related injuries. Indeed, it has been claimed that injuries and deaths of cyclists increased following the
introduction of the charge. A related issue is whether the accident rate per distance changed, rather than simply the
total accident count. Only if the likelihood of an accident actually falls can economists say the external costs were, at
least partially, internalised. Joint research with John Heywood (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) and Maria
Navarro (Lancaster University) seeks to address these issues using administrative data on traffic accidents matched
to the timing and characteristics of the congestion charge and its area.
An obvious difficulty is that we simply do not know what would have happened to accidents in the London congestion
zone in the absence of the charge. This means we must identify an appropriate comparison group. We adopt a
variety of definitions that use the most populous 20 cities in Britain, not including London. We contrast the change in
accidents in the congestion charge zone to the change over the same period in these other cities. We use the fact
that a downward trend in accidents happens in both London and the comparison group to more accurately identify
the influence of the charge. Our main result is that introducing the congestion charge reduced the count of traffic
accidents in Central London by 30 a month – an enormous 40 per cent reduction. Accidents that result in individuals
being killed or seriously injured (KSIs) also fell, by just under 4 a month, or 45 a year. In addition to saved travel
time, the congestion charge saved lives.
Does this reduction just reflect fewer vehicles in the zone? Mapping traffic flow data to the congestion zone we
constructed a measure of the rate of accidents – the number of accidents per million miles driven in the zone. We
found large reductions in the probability of a given traveller experiencing an accident, injury or fatality in the zone.
For instance, the probability of being killed or seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident fell by approximately 20
per cent. The charge did reduce the number of vehicles in the zone but it also made it safer for those drivers that
remained. This approach also allows us to reconcile the earlier debate over bicycle injuries and deaths. There was
an initial increase in accidents involving cyclists, roughly one and a half a month up to 2005. Yet, by the end of 2006
this had reversed. And at all times the congestion charge led to a reduction in the rate of cycling accidents. This
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initial increase in accident levels reflects markedly higher bicycle usage, consistent with it being explicitly
encouraged as alternative transport to charged vehicles.
A final policy concern is that the charge just moves the traffic, and hence accidents, to other parts of London, to
other times of day, and to non-charged vehicles. We find no evidence of such movement and, to the contrary, find
there large positive spill-overs from the policy. Charging in Central London decreased accidents dramatically in an
area of 4kms radius around the congestion zone. Similarly there were reductions in in non-charged times (before 7
am and after 6 pm) and for exempt vehicles (largely bicycles, motorcycles, taxies and buses).
These findings are important in terms of the considering the broader public benefits of the London Congestion
Charge. They also represent a dimension to be reflected by policy makers, and the general public, in other
jurisdictions who have either subsequently implemented congestion charges (Milan, Singapore), have rejected a
charge (Manchester, Manhattan) or in the process of putting it to vote (Vancouver). One important note for future
policy makers is that London returned the proceeds from the congestion charge into improving mass and alternative
transit. Thus, we have measured both the influence of the charge and how it was spent.
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